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On the 17 June, ‘the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’
(hereinafter: ‘fYROM’) and Greece signed an Agreement to resolve
their 27-year-long dispute over the former’s name. Most
importantly, fYROM committed to change its constitutional name
from ‘Republic of Macedonia’ to ‘Republic of North Macedonia’ for
both domestic and international purposes. The bizarre dispute
(and the Agreement itself) has raised interesting legal questions,
serving asthe most prominent case of an inter-state battle over
the choice of names and symbols of statehood and over identity.
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Furthermore, it offers an example of an issue that has attracted
limited attention in scholarship, i.e. the blocking of a country’s
accession to international organizations by another state-
member of the latter, for reasons that openly or covertly concern
a bilateral dispute between them that is unrelated to the
statutory functions of the organization involved.
In the present contribution I will share some general thoughts on
the matter, before discussing it against the backdrop of the
dispute between the two Balkan states and their recent
Agreement.
‘Vetoing’ the accession of third states to IOs: The international
law perspective
Whether a state can block the accession of another country to an
international organization is to be determined by looking at the
constitutive treaty of the organization at hand. The constitutional
provisions on voting arrangements differ across organizations
(providing for majority voting, weighted voting, consensus or
unanimity), but also potentially within the statute of the same
organization depending on which matter is to be decided. When
it comes to the accession of new members, decision-making is in
most cases governed by the rule of unanimity. This applies as
regards both the EU (Art. 49 TEU; Art. 218 TFEU) and NATO (Art.
10 North Atlantic Treaty). In those cases, we can speak of a ‘veto’
power in the wider sense conferred on each member state, given
that it is able to prevent a decision about the accession of a new
member state from being taken.
Suchprima facielawful ‘veto’ power becomes complex in view of
how it has been exercised by some states in practice. Indeed, we
have observed the threat and use of ‘veto’ being instrumentalized
by several countries as a negotiating tool in their disputes with
other states which aspire to join organizations in which the
former are members. By illustration, this was seen in the Slovene-
Croatian context, where Slovenia was for a long time blocking
Croatia’s EU accession negotiations because of their disputed
border in the Gulf of Piran. As the statutes of international
organizations are international treaties that fall under the remit
of the 1969 Vienna Convention, such an abusive use of ‘vetoing’
rights hardly complies with the obligation of states to perform
the treaties to which they are parties in good faith (Article 26
VCLT).
Operationalization of ‘veto’ in the Greek-fYROM naming
dispute
Ever since it gained its independence in 1991, the integration of
fYROM into international structures – mainly the UN, and later
on the EU and NATO – was a declaredobjective of multiple actors.
The new Republic, European states and the US, as well as the EU
and NATO, considered it as an important step in order to achieve
stability, peace and prosperity in the Balkans. Although Greece
itself professed to share this view,in the course of the bilateral
dispute over the name, the threat – and eventual use – of ‘veto’
over fYROM’s entry to the EU and NATO emerged as the primary
negotiating tool on the Greek side.
Between 1991-1995, the Greek strategy was to raise strong
objections to the international recognition of its northern
neighbour by other states and by the European Communities
(which resulted in the delayed recognition of the latter compared
to that of the other five former Yugoslav Republics), to halt its
admission to the UN under its constitutional name (it was
admitted only in 1993 under the provisional appellation ‘the
fYROM’), and to impose a trade embargo.
In September 1995, though, the two countries signed an Interim
Accord under which Greece inter aliaassumed an obligation ‘not
to objectto the application by or the membership of’ its neighbour
in international organizations of which Greece was a member,
provided that this application (or membership) had been made
under the designation ‘fYROM’ (Art. 11 para 1). Indeed, until 2008
Greece complied with this obligation, not posing any objections
to such applications or memberships of ‘fYROM’. During the same
period, however, the latter successfully pursued its international
recognition and reference under its constitutional name
‘Republic of Macedonia’ (some 120 state recognitions by 2008, 140
as of today). In view of these developments, Greece saw its ability
to thwart its neighbour’s NATO and EU accession as its last and
sole chance to prevent the de factoand definite solution of the
naming dispute to its disfavour, despite the fact that such a ‘right
to object’ on its part had been circumscribed by the obligations
that it had accepted under the 1995 Interim Accord.
In 2008 Greece made actual use of its ‘veto’ powers, blocking the
extension of an accession invitation to its Balkan neighbour
byNATO and the opening of its accession negotiations with the
EU, despite the fact that the latterhad agreed to the reference
‘fYROM’ for application purposes. In the framework of both
organizations, Athens successfully introduced ‘a mutually
acceptable solution to the name issue’ as a benchmark against
which the bids of fYROM were to be assessed.
Notably, the 2008 Greek ‘veto’ to fYROM’s NATO membership bid
resulted in a case against Greece before the ICJ, with the Court
finding in its 2011 Judgement that by objecting the extension of an
invitation to fYROM, Greece had breached its obligation under
the 1995 Interim Accord. Interestingly, the Court refused to order
fYROM’s Greece to refrain from similar actions in the future,
stating that ‘[a]s a general rule, there is no reason to suppose that
a State whose act or conduct has been declared wrongful by the
Court will repeat that act or conduct in the future, sinceits good
faith must be presumed’ (para. 168). Nevertheless, even after that
point in time the Greek position remained largely unchanged,
insisting in the prior resolution of the naming issue before
consenting to the initiation of the accession processes of fYROM
vis-à-vis both NATO and the EU.
The 2018 deal: Vindication of a wrongful and bad faith practice
The matter is treated in Article 2 of this June’s Agreement, where
Greece‘agrees not to object to the application by or the
membership of’ its co-signatory in international, multilateral and
regional organizations and institutionsunder its newly agreed
name(Republic of North Macedonia). On its part, fYROM commits
toseek admission to those entities under that same name. The
second requirement applies explicitly with particular regard to
fYROM’s application and eventual accession to the EU and NATO
(Art. 2(4)(a)).
Interestingly, although under Art. 20 the entry into force of most
of the provisions of the Agreement is conditioned on the
completion of multi-phased internal legal procedures by both
parties (as regards fYROM, these include inter aliaa possible
referendum and a constitutional amendment, see Art. 1), Greece
assumes a prompt obligationupon receiving the notice of the
ratification of the Agreement byfYROM’s parliament to notify the
President of the Council of the EU and the Secretary General of
NATO that it supports the openingof accession negotiations of
‘North Macedonia’. Nevertheless, the continuation of such a
support is conditional, first, on a positive outcome of the
referendum (if one is ever held in fYROM) and, subsequently, on
the successful completion of the constitutional amendments
envisaged in Art. 1. Lastly, it is provided that Greece will ratify
‘North Macedonia’s’ eventual NATO Accession Protocol only
uponreceipt of notificationby its co-signatory concerning the
completion of all its internal legal proceduresfor the entry into
force of the Agreement (again, these include a possible
referendum with an outcome consistent with the Agreementand
the successful conclusion of the constitutional amendments),
while the ratification of the Protocol will be concluded together
with that of the Agreement (Art. 2(4)(b)(ii)).
In sum, the beginning and fortunate completion of fYROM’s
accession processes regarding NATO, the EU and other
international organizations is now officially dependent on a
favourable solution of the naming dispute for Greece, as any
moderate observer understands the renaming of fYROM to
‘North Macedonia’ as such. That is, the Agreement departs and (if
entered into force) frees Greece from its obligations under Article
11(1) of the Interim Accord, and somehow vindicates the post-
2008 wrongful and bad faith negotiating policy of successive
Greek governments on the naming issue. From this perspective,
and albeit exemplary in other respects, this deal can be seen as a
bad lesson of how the threat and use of ‘veto’ is successfully
instrumentalised, in negligence of internationally assumed
obligations and international law principles.
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